Lavelle, Jane Suilin (2026) The pursuitworthiness of majority world psychology. European Journal for Philosophy of Science. ISSN 1879-4912

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Abstract

The recent pluralist turn in philosophy of science claims that we ought to support and maintain multiple epistemic frameworks for learning about phenomena. This position is especially clear in Massimi’s Perspectival Realism, which argues that it is only by having more than one perspective on a phenomenon that the potential for reliable knowledge about it emerges. This paper applies Perspectival Realism to the case of psychology—with a focus on developmental psychology—arguing first, that the discipline has pursued frameworks almost exclusively within a Minority World perspective, and second, that the lack of alternative perspectives precludes the field from knowing if its methods of knowledge production are reliable. To redress this problem, it advocates the pursuit of Majority World psychological frameworks, and points towards ways in which this could be achieved.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Lavelle, Jane Suilin 0000-0003-4409-0864
Subjects:	General Issues > Experimentation General Issues > Operationalism/Instrumentalism General Issues > Values In Science
Depositing User:	Dr Jane Suilin Lavelle
Date Deposited:	02 Jun 2026 18:37
Last Modified:	02 Jun 2026 18:37
Item ID:	29880
Journal or Publication Title:	European Journal for Philosophy of Science
Publisher:	Springer
Subjects:	General Issues > Experimentation General Issues > Operationalism/Instrumentalism General Issues > Values In Science
Date:	26 April 2026
ISSN:	1879-4912
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/29880

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