Glennan, Stuart (2007) Mechanisms, Causes and the Layered Model of the World. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Most philosophical accounts of causation take causal relations to obtain between individuals and events in virtue of nomological relations between properties of these individuals and events. Such views fail to take into account the consequences of the fact that in general the properties of individuals and events will depend upon mechanisms that realize those properties. In this paper I attempt to rectify this failure, and in so doing to provide an account of the causal relevance of higher-level properties. I do this by critiquing one prominent model of higher-level properties – Kim’s functional model of reduction – and contrasting it with a mechanistic approach to higher-level properties and causation.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Glennan, Stuart
Keywords:	Causation,Properties,Levels of Organization,Mechanisms
Subjects:	General Issues > Causation General Issues > Reductionism/Holism General Issues > Explanation
Depositing User:	Stuart Glennan
Date Deposited:	01 Dec 2007
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2010 15:15
Item ID:	3685
Subjects:	General Issues > Causation General Issues > Reductionism/Holism General Issues > Explanation
Date:	November 2007
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/3685

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