Sankey, Howard (2007) Semantic Incommensurability and Scientific Realism. [Preprint]

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Abstract

This paper reviews the situation with respect to the referential approach to the problem of semantic incommensurability. It argues that the thesis of semantic incommensurability does not pose a significant threat to scientific realism. However, there exists a "non-realist" defence of incommensurability, according to which the referential approach begs the question against advocates of the incommensurability thesis. This defence is criticized, and the basis for a realist response to incommensurability is presented.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Sankey, Howard
Keywords:	scientific realism, incommensurability, meta-incommensurability
Subjects:	General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User:	Howard Sankey
Date Deposited:	11 Dec 2007
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2010 15:15
Item ID:	3717
Subjects:	General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date:	December 2007
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/3717

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