Dorato, Mauro (2012) Presentism/Eternalism and Endurantism/Perdurantism: why the unsubstantiality of the first debate implies that of the second1. [Preprint]

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Abstract

The main claim that I want to defend in this paper is that the there are logical equivalences between eternalism and perdurantism on the one hand and presentism and endurantism on the other. By “logical equivalence” I mean that one position is entailed and entails the other. As a consequence of this equivalence, it becomes important to inquire into the question whether the dispute between endurantists and perdurantists is authentic, given that Savitt (2006) Dolev (2006) and Dorato (2006) have cast doubts on the fact that the debate between presentism and eternalism is about “what there is”. In this respect, I will conclude that also the debate about persistence in time has no ontological consequences, in the sense that there is no real ontological disagreement between the two allegedly opposite positions: as in the case of the presentism/eternalism debate, one can be both a perdurantist and an endurantist, depending on which linguistic framework is preferred

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Dorato, Mauro mauro.dorato@gmail.com
Keywords:	Metaphysics of time, Persistence, perdurantism, endurantism, presentism, eternalism
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Physics > Relativity Theory
Depositing User:	Dr Mauro Dorato
Date Deposited:	24 Feb 2012 11:49
Last Modified:	05 Dec 2012 23:43
Item ID:	9027
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Physics > Relativity Theory
Date:	2012
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9027

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