Saatsi, Juha (2013) Inconsistency and Scientific Realism. [Preprint]
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Abstract
I erect a framework within the semantic view of theories for explaining the empirical success of internally inconsistent models and theories, with scientific realism in mind. The framework is an instance of the ‘content-driven’ approach to inconsistency, advocated by both Norton (1987) and Smith (1988), whose ideas my analysis aims to clarify and substantiate.
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| Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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| Additional Information: | Forthcoming in Synthese | ||||||
| Keywords: | Inconsistency; Realism | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Models and Idealization General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism |
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| Depositing User: | Juha Saatsi | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 15 Feb 2013 14:09 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 15 Feb 2013 14:09 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 9568 | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Models and Idealization General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism |
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| Date: | 2013 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9568 |
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