PhilSci Archive

Explaining New Phenomena in Terms of Previous Phenomena

Bod, Rens (2004) Explaining New Phenomena in Terms of Previous Phenomena. [Preprint]

Download (65Kb) | Preview


    It has become increasingly clear that natural phenomena cannot be formally deduced from laws but that almost every phenomenon has its own particular way of being linked to higher-level generalizations, usually via approximations, normalizations and corrections. This article deals with the following problem: if there are no general principles to link laws to phenomena, and if each phenomenon has its own way of being explained, how can we -- or how can a theory -- explain any new phenomenon? I will argue that while particular explanations only apply to the specific phenomena they describe, parts of such explanations can be productively reused in explaining new phenomena. This leads to a view on theory, which I call maximalism, according to which new phenomena are understood in terms of previous phenomena. On the maximalist view, a theory is not a system of axioms or a class of models, but a dynamically updated corpus of explanations. New phenomena are explained by combining fragments of explanations of previous phenomena. I will give an instantiation of this view, based on a corpus of phenomena from classical and fluid mechanics, and show that the maximalist approach is not only used but also needed in scientific practice.

    Export/Citation:EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
    Social Networking:

    Item Type: Preprint
    Keywords: particularism, exemplar-based explanation, model-based reasoning, analogy-based explanation, maximalism
    Subjects: General Issues > Structure of Theories
    General Issues > Models and Idealization
    General Issues > Laws of Nature
    General Issues > Explanation
    Specific Sciences > Physics
    Depositing User: Rens Bod
    Date Deposited: 06 Feb 2004
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:12
    Item ID: 1602

    Actions (login required)

    View Item

    Document Downloads