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Conceptual truth versus empirical truth

Icefield, William (2020) Conceptual truth versus empirical truth. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Ontological arguments seek to affirm existence of a priori empirical truths by use of logic. I focus on Godel's ontological proof. Axioms utilized are definitional by usual standards, which is one reason why controversies surrounding the proof still linger on. I argue that logic without empirical supports can only be used to prove conceptual truths. In order for logic to prove empirical truths, definitions and axioms used must be based on established truths of actual reality. How Thomas Aquinas's criticism of ontological arguments unfolds in context of modern modal higher-order logic is discussed.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Icefield, Williamwilliamicefield@gmail.com
Keywords: Godel's ontological proof, modal higher-order logic, conceptual truth, empirical truth, conceivable property, Thomas Aquinas
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Applicability
Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Epistemology
Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Logic
Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Ontology
General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Depositing User: William Icefield
Date Deposited: 01 Feb 2020 17:40
Last Modified: 01 Feb 2020 17:40
Item ID: 16873
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Applicability
Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Epistemology
Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Logic
Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Ontology
General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Date: 24 January 2020
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16873

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