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What kind of kind is intelligence?

Serpico, Davide (2018) What kind of kind is intelligence? Philosophical Psychology, 31 (2). pp. 232-252. ISSN 0951-5089

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Abstract

The model of human intelligence that is most widely adopted derives from psychometrics and behavioral genetics. This standard approach conceives intelligence as a general cognitive ability that is genetically highly heritable and describable using quantitative traits analysis. The paper analyzes intelligence within the debate on natural kinds and contends that the general intelligence conceptualization does not carve psychological nature at its joints. Moreover, I argue that this model assumes an essentialist perspective. As an alternative, I consider an HPC theory of intelligence and evaluate how it deals with essentialism and with intuitions coming from cognitive science. Finally, I highlight some concerns about the HPC model as well, and conclude by suggesting that it is unnecessary to treat intelligence as a kind in any sense.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Serpico, Davide
Keywords: Intelligence; IQ; g Factor; Natural Kinds; Homeostatic Property Cluster; Essentialism; Psychometrics; Behavioral Genetics; Heritability
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Biology > Molecular Biology/Genetics
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
General Issues > Natural Kinds
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
Specific Sciences > Psychology
Depositing User: Dr. Davide Serpico
Date Deposited: 11 May 2020 18:34
Last Modified: 11 May 2020 18:34
Item ID: 17171
Journal or Publication Title: Philosophical Psychology
Official URL: http://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2017.1401706
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.1080/09515089.2017.1401706
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Biology > Molecular Biology/Genetics
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
General Issues > Natural Kinds
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
Specific Sciences > Psychology
Date: 2018
Page Range: pp. 232-252
Volume: 31
Number: 2
ISSN: 0951-5089
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/17171

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