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g as bridge model

Curry, Devin Sanchez (2020) g as bridge model. In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

g--a statistical factor capturing strong intercorrelations between individuals’ scores on different IQ tests--is of theoretical interest despite being a low-fidelity model of both folk psychological intelligence and its cognitive/neural underpinnings. g idealizes away from those aspects of cognitive/neural mechanisms that are not explanatory of the relevant variety of folk psychological intelligence, and idealizes away from those aspects of folk psychological intelligence that are not generated by the relevant cognitive/neural substrate. In this manner, g constitutes a high-fidelity bridge model of the relationship between its two targets, and thereby helps demystify the relationship between folk and scientific psychology.


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Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Curry, Devin Sanchezdevin.curry@mail.wvu.edu0000-0002-9678-5353
Keywords: intelligence; reduction; differential psychology; folk psychology; cognitive psychology; cognitive neuroscience
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Neuroscience > Cognitive Neuroscience
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Specific Sciences > Psychology
General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
Depositing User: Dr. Devin Sanchez Curry
Date Deposited: 04 Jul 2020 03:06
Last Modified: 04 Jul 2020 03:06
Item ID: 17430
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Neuroscience > Cognitive Neuroscience
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Specific Sciences > Psychology
General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
Date: 2020
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/17430

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