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Why Functionalism Is a Form of ‘Token-Dualism’

Hemmo, Meir and Shenker, Orly R. (2020) Why Functionalism Is a Form of ‘Token-Dualism’. [Preprint]

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Abstract

We present a novel reductive theory of type-identity physicalism (called Flat Physicalism), which is inspired by the foundations of statistical mechanics as a general theory of natural kinds. We show that all the claims mounted against type-identity physicalism in the literature don’t apply to Flat Physicalism, and moreover that this reductive theory solves many of the problems faced by the various non-reductive approaches including functionalism. In particular, we show that Flat Physicalism can account for the (alleged) appearance of multiple realizability in the special sciences, and that it gives a novel account of the genuine autonomy of the kinds and laws in the special sciences. We further show that the thesis of genuine multiple realization, which is compatible with all forms of non-reductive approaches including functionalism, implies what we call token-dualism; namely the idea that in every token (that partakes in this multiple realization) there are non-physical facts, which may either be non-physical properties or some non-physical substance. In other words, we prove that non-reductive kinds necessarily assume non-reductive tokens, i.e., token dualism. Finally, we show that all forms of non-reductive approaches including functionalism imply a literally multi-leveled structure of reality.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Hemmo, Meirmeir@research.haifa.ac.il
Shenker, Orly R.orly.shenker@mail.huji.ac.il
Keywords: Keywords: anomaly; autonomy of special sciences; functionalism; computational functionalism; multiple-realizability; non-reductive physicalism; reductive physicalism; type-identity; token; levels of reality.
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Biology > Function/Teleology
Specific Sciences > Neuroscience > Cognitive Neuroscience
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
General Issues > Natural Kinds
General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
General Issues > Structure of Theories
Depositing User: Dr Orly Shenker
Date Deposited: 11 Sep 2020 14:18
Last Modified: 11 Sep 2020 14:18
Item ID: 18073
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Biology > Function/Teleology
Specific Sciences > Neuroscience > Cognitive Neuroscience
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
General Issues > Natural Kinds
General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
General Issues > Structure of Theories
Date: 2020
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/18073

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