Norton, John D. (2012) Challenges to Bayesian Confirmation Theory. [Preprint]

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Abstract

While Bayesian analysis has enjoyed notable success with many particular problems of inductive inference, it is not the one true and universal logic of induction. I review why the Bayesian approach fails to provide this universal logic of induction. Some of the reasons arise at the global level through the existence of competing systems of inductive logic. Others emerge through an examination of the individual assumptions that, when combined, form the Bayesian system: that there is a real valued magnitude that expresses evidential support, that it is additive and that its treatment of logical conjunction is such that Bayes' theorem ensues.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Norton, John D. jdnorton@pitt.edu
Keywords:	Bayes confirmation induction probability
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
Depositing User:	John Norton
Date Deposited:	12 May 2012 13:18
Last Modified:	12 May 2012 13:18
Item ID:	9111
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
Date:	11 May 2012
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9111

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