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Phenomenal Experiences, First-Person Methods, and the Artificiality of Experimental Data

Feest, Uljana (2012) Phenomenal Experiences, First-Person Methods, and the Artificiality of Experimental Data. In: [2012] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 23rd Biennial Mtg (San Diego, CA) > PSA 2012 Symposia.

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    Abstract

    This paper argues that whereas philosophical discussions of first-person methods often turn on the veridicality of first-person reports, more attention should be paid to the experimental circumstances under which the reports are generated, and to the purposes of designing such experiments. After pointing to the ‘constructedness’ of first-person reports in the science of perception, I raise questions about the criteria by which to judge whether the reports illuminate something about the nature of perception. I illustrate this point with a historical debate between Gestalt psychologist and atomists, both of whom used first-person methods to investigate perception


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    Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
    Keywords: first-person data, introspective evidence, philosophy of psychology, history and philosophy of psychology, epistemology of experimentation
    Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
    Conferences and Volumes: [2012] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 23rd Biennial Mtg (San Diego, CA) > PSA 2012 Symposia
    Depositing User: Dr. Uljana Feest
    Date Deposited: 10 Dec 2012 09:36
    Last Modified: 10 Dec 2012 09:36
    Item ID: 9472
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9472

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