Feest, Uljana (2012) Phenomenal Experiences, First-Person Methods, and the Artificiality of Experimental Data. In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

This paper argues that whereas philosophical discussions of first-person methods often turn on the veridicality of first-person reports, more attention should be paid to the experimental circumstances under which the reports are generated, and to the purposes of designing such experiments. After pointing to the ‘constructedness’ of first-person reports in the science of perception, I raise questions about the criteria by which to judge whether the reports illuminate something about the nature of perception. I illustrate this point with a historical debate between Gestalt psychologist and atomists, both of whom used first-person methods to investigate perception

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Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Feest, Uljana feest@mail.tu-berlin.de
Keywords:	first-person data, introspective evidence, philosophy of psychology, history and philosophy of psychology, epistemology of experimentation
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
Depositing User:	Dr. Uljana Feest
Date Deposited:	10 Dec 2012 14:36
Last Modified:	10 Dec 2012 14:36
Item ID:	9472
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
Date:	16 November 2012
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9472

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• Phenomenal Experiences, First-Person Methods, and the Artificiality of Experimental Data. (deposited UNSPECIFIED)
  • Phenomenal Experiences, First-Person Methods, and the Artificiality of Experimental Data. (deposited 10 Dec 2012 14:36) [Currently Displayed]

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