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Objective chance: not propensity, maybe determinism

Hoefer, Carl (2016) Objective chance: not propensity, maybe determinism. Lato Sensu, revue de la Société de philosophie des sciences, 3 (1). pp. 31-42. ISSN 2295-8029

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One currently popular view about the nature of objective probabilities, or objective chances, is that they – or some of them, at least – are primitive features of the physical world, not reducible to anything else nor explicable in terms of frequencies, degrees of belief, or anything else. In this paper I explore the question of what the semantic content of primitive chance claims could be. Every attempt I look at to supply such content either comes up empty-handed, or begs important questions against the skeptic who doubts the meaningfulness of primitive chance claims. In the second half of the paper I show that, by contrast, there are clear, and clearly contentful, ways to understand objective chance claims if we ground them on deterministic physical underpinnings.

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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Keywords: chance; probability; propensity; primitive chance; subjective probability; determinism; indeterminism; Humeanism; frequentism
Subjects: General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism
Depositing User: Lato Sensu
Date Deposited: 25 Feb 2017 15:57
Last Modified: 25 Feb 2017 15:57
Item ID: 12845
Journal or Publication Title: Lato Sensu, revue de la Société de philosophie des sciences
Publisher: Société de philosophie des sciences
Official URL:
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.20416/lsrsps.v3i1.603
Subjects: General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism
Date: December 2016
Page Range: pp. 31-42
Volume: 3
Number: 1
ISSN: 2295-8029

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