Roush, Sherrilyn (2016) Simulation and Understanding Other Minds. Nous - Philosophical Issues, 26.
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Abstract
There is much disagreement about how extensive a role theoretical mindreading,
behavior-reading, and simulation each have and need to have in
our knowing and understanding other minds, and how each method is implemented
in the brain, but less discussion of the epistemological question
what it is about the products of these methods that makes them count as
knowledge or understanding. This question has become especially salient
recently as some have the intuition that mirror neurons can bring understanding
of another’s action despite involving no higher-order processing,
whereas most epistemologists writing about understanding think that it requires
reflective access to one’s grounds, which is closer to the intuitions of other commenters on mirror neurons. I offer a definition of what it is that makes something understanding that is compelling independently of the context of cognition of other minds, and use it to show two things: 1)
that theoretical mind-reading and simulation bring understanding in virtue of the same epistemic feature, and 2) why the kind of motor representation without propositional attitudes that is done by mirror neurons is sufficient for action understanding. I further suggest that more attention should be paid to the potential disadvantages of a simulative method of knowing. Though it can be more efficient in some cases, it can also bring vulnerability, wear and tear on one’s personal equipment, and unintended mimicry.
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| Item Type: | Published Article or Volume | ||||||
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| Keywords: | simulation theory, theory of mind, understanding, mirror neurons | ||||||
| Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Neuroscience > Cognitive Neuroscience Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science Specific Sciences > Neuroscience Specific Sciences > Psychology |
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| Depositing User: | Sherrilyn Roush | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 30 Jun 2020 02:37 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 30 Jun 2020 02:37 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 17407 | ||||||
| Journal or Publication Title: | Nous - Philosophical Issues | ||||||
| Official URL: | https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12079 | ||||||
| DOI or Unique Handle: | 10.1111/phis.12079 | ||||||
| Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Neuroscience > Cognitive Neuroscience Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science Specific Sciences > Neuroscience Specific Sciences > Psychology |
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| Date: | 2016 | ||||||
| Volume: | 26 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/17407 |
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