Heesen, Remco (2021) Cumulative Advantage and the Incentive to Commit Fraud in Science. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. ISSN 1464-3537

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Abstract

This paper investigates how the credit incentive to engage in questionable research practices (up to and including fraud) interacts with cumulative advantage, the process whereby high-status academics more easily increase their status than low-status academics. I use a mathematical model to highlight two dynamics that have not yet received much attention. First, due to cumulative advantage, questionable research practices may pay off over the course of an academic career even if they are not attractive at the level of individual publications. Second, because of the role of bottleneck moments in academic careers, questionable research practices may be selected for even if they do not provide a benefit in expectation. I also observe that, within the model, the most successful academics are the most likely to have benefited from fraud.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Heesen, Remco r.heesen@lse.ac.uk 0000-0003-3823-944X
Keywords:	Philosophy of science; Credit economy; Cumulative advantage; Scientific fraud; Social epistemology; Formal epistemology
Subjects:	General Issues > Computer Simulation General Issues > Decision Theory General Issues > Ethical Issues General Issues > Game Theory General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
Depositing User:	Remco Heesen
Date Deposited:	08 Jul 2021 00:38
Last Modified:	09 Aug 2023 14:11
Item ID:	19295
Journal or Publication Title:	The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Official URL:	https://doi.org/10.1086/716235
DOI or Unique Handle:	10.1086/716235
Subjects:	General Issues > Computer Simulation General Issues > Decision Theory General Issues > Ethical Issues General Issues > Game Theory General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
Date:	2 July 2021
ISSN:	1464-3537
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/19295

Available Versions of this Item

• Questionable Research Practices and Credit in Academic Careers. (deposited 16 Nov 2020 14:58)
  • Cumulative Advantage and the Incentive to Commit Fraud in Science. (deposited 08 Jul 2021 00:38) [Currently Displayed]
    • Cumulative Advantage and the Incentive to Commit Fraud in Science. (deposited 29 Aug 2024 04:04)

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