Facchin, Marco (2022) Why can’t we say what cognition is (at least for the time being). [Preprint]

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Abstract

Some philosophers search for the mark of the cognitive: a set of individually necessary and jointly
suΜcient conditions identifying all and only the instances of cognition. They claim the mark is
necessary to answer diΜcult questions concerning the nature and distribution of cognition.
Here, I will argue that, as things stand, given the current landscape of cognitive science, we are
not able to identify a mark of the cognitive. I proceed as follows. First, I clarify some factors
motivating the search for the mark of the cognitive, thereby highlighting the desiderata the mark
is supposed to satisfy. Then, I highlight a tension in the literature over the mark. Given the
literature, it is not clear whether the search aims for a mark capturing the intuitive notion of
cognition or a genuine scientiΞc kind. I then consider each option in turn, claiming that,either
way, no mark satisfying the desiderata can be provided. I then deΟect a foreseeable objection and
highlight some implications of my view.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Facchin, Marco marco.facchin@iusspavia.it 0000-0001-5753-9873
Keywords:	Mark of the cognitive, Cognition wars, DeΞnition, Necessary conditions, Minimal cognition, Embodied cognition, Representation
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Neuroscience > Cognitive Neuroscience Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science General Issues > Natural Kinds General Issues > Theory Change
Depositing User:	Dr. Marco Facchin
Date Deposited:	28 Jan 2023 14:15
Last Modified:	28 Jan 2023 14:15
Item ID:	21689
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Neuroscience > Cognitive Neuroscience Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science General Issues > Natural Kinds General Issues > Theory Change
Date:	2022
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/21689

Available Versions of this Item

• Why can’t we say what cognition is (at least for the time being). (deposited 20 Mar 2022 03:29)
  • Why can’t we say what cognition is (at least for the time being). (deposited 28 Jan 2023 14:15) [Currently Displayed]

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