Kelley, Mikayla (2023) A Contextual Accuracy Dominance Argument for Probabilism. [Preprint]

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Abstract

A central motivation for Probabilism---the principle of rationality that requires one to have credences that satisfy the axioms of probability---is the accuracy dominance argument: one should not have accuracy dominated credences, and one avoids accuracy dominance just in case one satisfies Probabilism. Until recently, the accuracy dominance argument for Probabilism has been restricted to finite credal sets. One reason for this is that it is not clear how to measure the accuracy of infinitely many credences in a motivated way. In particular, as recent work has shown, the conditions often imposed in the finite setting are mutually inconsistent in certain infinite settings. In this paper, I offer a fully general accuracy dominance argument for Probabilism that is consistent with that not all sets of credences can be measured for accuracy. The normative core of the argument is the principle that one should not have credences that would be accuracy dominated in some epistemic context one might find oneself in if there are alternative credences which do not have this defect. An important upshot of the proposed argument is a general "contextualizing" strategy for extending accuracy arguments restricted to the finite setting.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Kelley, Mikayla 0000-0001-5131-0525
Keywords:	accuracy-first epistemology, probabilism, bayesian epistemology, dominance, inaccuracy measure, context, question
Subjects:	General Issues > Decision Theory Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Depositing User:	Mikayla Kelley
Date Deposited:	14 Sep 2023 19:47
Last Modified:	14 Sep 2023 19:47
Item ID:	22428
Subjects:	General Issues > Decision Theory Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Date:	10 September 2023
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/22428

Available Versions of this Item

• A Contextual Accuracy Dominance Argument for Probabilism. (deposited 29 Jul 2023 20:22)
  • A Contextual Accuracy Dominance Argument for Probabilism. (deposited 14 Sep 2023 19:47) [Currently Displayed]

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