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Rational Aversion to Information

Neth, Sven (2023) Rational Aversion to Information. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Is more information always better? Or are there some situations in which more information can make us worse off? Good (1966) argues that expected utility maximizers should always accept more information if the information is cost-free and relevant. But Good's argument presupposes that you are certain you will update by conditionalization. If we relax this assumption and allow agents to be uncertain about updating, these agents can be rationally required to reject free and relevant information. Since there are good reasons to be uncertain about updating, rationality can require you to prefer ignorance.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Neth, Svennethsven@berkeley.edu0000-0003-4275-7581
Additional Information: Accepted in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Keywords: Value of Information, Decision Theory, Bayesian Epistemology, Probability
Subjects: General Issues > Decision Theory
Specific Sciences > Economics
General Issues > Evidence
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Learning and Memory
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Depositing User: Sven Neth
Date Deposited: 08 Sep 2023 20:45
Last Modified: 08 Sep 2023 20:45
Item ID: 22516
Subjects: General Issues > Decision Theory
Specific Sciences > Economics
General Issues > Evidence
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Learning and Memory
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Date: September 2023
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/22516

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