Stoica, Ovidiu Cristinel (2023) Asking physics about physicalism, zombies, and consciousness. [Preprint]
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Abstract
If the mind of a sentient being would be reducible to its structure, any system with identical structure should be equally sentient. Based on the structural symmetries of Physics, I prove that this thesis has two unexpected consequences:
1) There would be an inflation of minds, living in apparently different worlds.
2) The content of these minds would be independent of the properties of the external world. That is, these minds would be unable to know anything about the world.
Since this contradicts empirical observations, structure alone is insufficient for sentient experience.
This excludes the purely physicalist approaches to physics and consciousness. For physics to be as we know it, all physical properties have to be grounded in something sentiential.
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Asking physics about physicalism, zombies, and consciousness. (deposited 28 Aug 2023 14:05)
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Asking physics about physicalism, zombies, and consciousness. (deposited 15 Nov 2023 01:50)
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Asking physics about physicalism, zombies, and consciousness. (deposited 15 Nov 2023 01:50)
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