List, Christian (2024) Probabilistically coherent credences despite opacity. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Real human agents, even when they are rational by everyday standards, sometimes assign different credences to objectively equivalent statements, such as “George Orwell is a writer” and “Eric Arthur Blair is a writer”, or credences less than 1 to necessarily true statements, such as not-yet-proven theorems of arithmetic. Anna Mahtani calls this the phenomenon of “opacity” (a form of hyperintensionality). Opaque credences seem probabilistically incoherent, which goes against a key modelling assumption of probability theory. I sketch a modelling strategy for capturing opaque credence assignments without abandoning probabilistic coherence. I draw on ideas from judgment-aggregation theory, where we face similar challenges of defining the “objects of judgment”.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID List, Christian
Keywords:	Credences, opacity, hyperintensionality, probabilistic coherence, subjective vs objective consistency, impossible worlds
Subjects:	General Issues > Decision Theory Specific Sciences > Economics Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Depositing User:	Christian List
Date Deposited:	27 Mar 2024 11:29
Last Modified:	27 Mar 2024 11:29
Item ID:	23228
Official URL:	https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267124000038
DOI or Unique Handle:	10.1017/S0266267124000038
Subjects:	General Issues > Decision Theory Specific Sciences > Economics Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Date:	March 2024
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/23228

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