List, Christian (2024) Probabilistically coherent credences despite opacity. [Preprint]
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Abstract
Real human agents, even when they are rational by everyday standards, sometimes assign different credences to objectively equivalent statements, such as “George Orwell is a writer” and “Eric Arthur Blair is a writer”, or credences less than 1 to necessarily true statements, such as not-yet-proven theorems of arithmetic. Anna Mahtani calls this the phenomenon of “opacity” (a form of hyperintensionality). Opaque credences seem probabilistically incoherent, which goes against a key modelling assumption of probability theory. I sketch a modelling strategy for capturing opaque credence assignments without abandoning probabilistic coherence. I draw on ideas from judgment-aggregation theory, where we face similar challenges of defining the “objects of judgment”.
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Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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Keywords: | Credences, opacity, hyperintensionality, probabilistic coherence, subjective vs objective consistency, impossible worlds | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Decision Theory Specific Sciences > Economics Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics |
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Depositing User: | Christian List | ||||||
Date Deposited: | 27 Mar 2024 11:29 | ||||||
Last Modified: | 27 Mar 2024 11:29 | ||||||
Item ID: | 23228 | ||||||
Official URL: | https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267124000038 | ||||||
DOI or Unique Handle: | 10.1017/S0266267124000038 | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Decision Theory Specific Sciences > Economics Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics |
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Date: | March 2024 | ||||||
URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/23228 |
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