PhilSci Archive

Sex Traits and Individual Differences: Stabilising and Destabilising Binary Categories in Biological Practice

Thinius, Alex and Trappes, Rose (2024) Sex Traits and Individual Differences: Stabilising and Destabilising Binary Categories in Biological Practice. [Preprint]

[img] Text
Thinius Trappes Sex traits and individual differences_AAM_preprint.docx - Accepted Version
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution.

Download (51kB)

Abstract

Sex is often thought of as a straightforwardly binary categorical variable. Yet there is considerable variation in would-be sex traits; from genitals and hormones to morphology, neurology and behaviour, there is rarely if ever a categorical binary. We introduce a strategy that researchers use to deal with this variation: Individualising Variation (IV). IV involves treating non-binary and gradual variation as idiosyncratic, as individual differences rather than sex-based differences. Using the contrasting cases of sex identification in field ornithology and the debate about sex differences in neuroscience, we illustrate IV and investigate its epistemic and conceptual consequences. We argue that IV stabilises the ontological picture of sex as categorical and binary. While IV can be an epistemically benign research strategy in some cases, we argue that it can also be epistemically detrimental. This is because of its ability to mask evidence that would otherwise challenge related assumptions about the phenomenon of interest, such as what sexes are and what they look like. We also identify an alternative strategy, De-individualising Variation, which works against IV and helps life scientists recognise variation beyond categorical binaries.


Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Thinius, Alexa.c.thinius@protonmail.com0000-0002-7296-4891
Trappes, Roser.g.trappes@exeter.ac.uk0000-0002-6398-5404
Keywords: sex differences; inter-individual variation; generalisation; brain sex; field guides; 3Gsex
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Biology
Specific Sciences > Biology > Ecology/Conservation
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
General Issues > Feminist Approaches
Specific Sciences > Neuroscience
General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
General Issues > Theory Change
Depositing User: Dr. AC Thinius
Date Deposited: 29 Jun 2024 00:55
Last Modified: 29 Jun 2024 00:55
Item ID: 23650
Journal or Publication Title: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Biology
Specific Sciences > Biology > Ecology/Conservation
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
General Issues > Feminist Approaches
Specific Sciences > Neuroscience
General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
General Issues > Theory Change
Date: 2024
ISSN: 1464-3537
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/23650

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item