Krause, Décio (2025) Some remarks about going towards inconsistencies. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Inconsistencies! What do they mean? Can we support them? With this
paper, we hope to contribute to the claim that we can tolerate inconsistencies in certain situations even without considering any logic that may
enable us to do that, say some paraconsistent logic. We argue that in many
cases where we apply reason, we work in domains where inconsistencies
appear, and even so, we neither get them out (but ‘support’ them) nor modify the underlying logic (such as classical logic) to avoid logical troubles. To
make things more precise, we distinguish between inconsistency, anomaly,
and contradiction. Our thesis is that we can reason sensibly with classical
logic even in the presence of inconsistencies once (as we explain) we either
‘do not go there’ or make things so that the inconsistent sentences cannot be
joined to arrive at a contradiction. Some sample cases are given to motivate
the discussion.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Krause, Décio 0000-003-0463-2796
Keywords:	inconsistency, contradiction, anomalies, paraconsistency, com- plementarity, quantum negation, Zande logic, Wittgenstein, the logic of ‘not going there'
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Foundations Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Logic General Issues > Structure of Theories
Depositing User:	Prof. Décio Krause
Date Deposited:	02 Apr 2025 17:41
Last Modified:	02 Apr 2025 17:41
Item ID:	24986
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Foundations Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Logic General Issues > Structure of Theories
Date:	1 April 2025
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/24986

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