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Much ado about ‘n’othing

Ramsey, Grant (2026) Much ado about ‘n’othing. [Preprint]

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Abstract

This article argues that a core area of the philosophy of biology—the philosophy of fitness—has for decades rested on fundamental conceptual and mathematical errors. These errors have been leveraged to support the position in the philosophy of biology known as statisticalism, which holds that biological fitness does not cause evolution, but is merely a kind of statistical summary of evolutionary outcomes. This is opposed to causalism, which holds that fitness is based on (causally efficacious) probabilistic propensities, a position known as the propensity interpretation of fitness. The error I focus on is the idea that fitness depends on population size, n, and because population size is not a causal quantity, fitness cannot be causal. In this paper, I show that fitness is not dependent on n and therefore a central critique of the propensity interpretation of fitness is ill founded.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Ramsey, Grantgrant@theramseylab.org0000-0002-8712-5521
Keywords: Evolution; Natural Selection; Fitness; Drift; Causation; Statisticalism
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Biology
Specific Sciences > Biology > Developmental Biology
Specific Sciences > Biology > Ecology/Conservation
Specific Sciences > Biology > Evolutionary Theory
General Issues > Causation
Specific Sciences > Cultural Evolution
General Issues > Evidence
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > Models and Idealization
General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
Depositing User: Dr. Grant Ramsey
Date Deposited: 03 Jan 2026 02:16
Last Modified: 03 Jan 2026 02:16
Item ID: 27701
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Biology
Specific Sciences > Biology > Developmental Biology
Specific Sciences > Biology > Ecology/Conservation
Specific Sciences > Biology > Evolutionary Theory
General Issues > Causation
Specific Sciences > Cultural Evolution
General Issues > Evidence
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > Models and Idealization
General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
Date: 2026
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/27701

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