Szabo, Laszlo E. (2010) How can physics account for mathematical truth? [Preprint]

Preview

PDF szabo-phys_math.pdf Download (475kB)

Abstract

If physicalism is true, everything is physical. In other words, everything supervenes on, or is necessitated by, the physical. Accordingly, if there are logical/mathematical facts, they must be necessitated by the physical facts of the world. In this paper, I will sketch the first steps of a physicalist philosophy of mathematics; that is, how physicalism can account for logical and mathematical facts. We will proceed as follows. First we will clarify what logical/mathematical facts actually are. Then, we will discuss how these facts can be accommodated in the physicalist ontology. This might sound like immanent realism (as in Mill, Armstrong, Kitcher, or Maddy), according to which the mathematical concepts and propositions reflect some fundamental features of the physical world. Although, in my final conclusion I will claim that mathematical and logical truths do have contingent content in a sophisticated sense, and they are about some peculiar part of the physical world, I reject the idea, as this thesis is usually understood, that mathematics is about the physical world in general. In fact, I reject the idea that mathematics is about anything. In contrast, the view I am proposing here will be based on the strongest formalist approach to mathematics.

---

Export/Citation:

EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL

Social Networking:

Share |

---

Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Szabo, Laszlo E.
Keywords:	physicalism, mathematical truth, formalism, formal system, physical theory, empiricism
Subjects:	General Issues > Theory/Observation General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism General Issues > Laws of Nature Specific Sciences > Mathematics General Issues > Reductionism/Holism General Issues > Structure of Theories Specific Sciences > Physics
Depositing User:	Prof. Laszlo E. Szabo
Date Deposited:	07 May 2010
Last Modified:	01 Jul 2012 04:24
Item ID:	5338
Subjects:	General Issues > Theory/Observation General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism General Issues > Laws of Nature Specific Sciences > Mathematics General Issues > Reductionism/Holism General Issues > Structure of Theories Specific Sciences > Physics
Date:	May 2010
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/5338

Available Versions of this Item

• How can physics account for mathematical truth? (deposited 07 May 2010) [Currently Displayed]
  • Mathematical Facts in a Physicalist Ontology. (deposited 01 Jul 2012 04:24)
    • Mathematical Facts in a Physicalist Ontology. (deposited 22 Jul 2013 08:38)

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item