Csatári, Ferenc (2011) Some Remarks on the Physicalist Account of Mathematics. [Preprint]
|
PDF
physform-csf.pdf - Draft Version Download (118kB) |
Abstract
The paper comments on a rather uncommon approach to mathematics called physicalist formalism, according to which formal systems are genuine physical systems. A brief review of the main theses is given, then arguments are worked out, concerning mostly with the practice of mathematics and the uniqueness of formal systems, aiming to show the implausibility of this radical view.
Export/Citation: | EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL |
Social Networking: |
Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Creators: |
|
||||||
Keywords: | philosophy of mathematics, formalism, physicalism, empiricism | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Conventionalism Specific Sciences > Mathematics General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism |
||||||
Depositing User: | Ferenc Csatári | ||||||
Date Deposited: | 18 Oct 2011 11:42 | ||||||
Last Modified: | 18 Oct 2011 11:42 | ||||||
Item ID: | 8847 | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Conventionalism Specific Sciences > Mathematics General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism |
||||||
Date: | 2011 | ||||||
URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/8847 |
Monthly Views for the past 3 years
Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years
Plum Analytics
Actions (login required)
View Item |