Nyrup, Rune (2014) How Explanatory Reasoning Justifies Pursuit: A Peircean View of IBE. In: UNSPECIFIED.
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Abstract
This paper defends an account of explanatory reasoning generally, and inference to the best explanation in particular, according to which it first and foremost justifies pursuing hypotheses rather than accepting them as true. This side-steps the problem of why better explanations should be more likely to be true. I argue that this account faces no analogous problems. I propose an account of justification for pursuit and show how this provides a simple and straightforward connection between explanatoriness and justification for pursuit.
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| Item Type: | Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED) | ||||||
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| Keywords: | IBE; explanatory reasoning; justification for pursuit; pursuitworthiness; C.S. Peirce; Peter Lipton | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Decision Theory General Issues > Explanation General Issues > Philosophers of Science |
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| Depositing User: | Mr Rune Nyrup | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 05 Nov 2014 21:18 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 05 Nov 2014 21:18 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 11126 | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Decision Theory General Issues > Explanation General Issues > Philosophers of Science |
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| Date: | 9 November 2014 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/11126 |
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