Sullivan, Jacqueline (2015) Construct Stabilization and the Unity of the Mind-Brain Sciences. In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

This paper offers a critique of an account of explanatory integration that claims that explanations of cognitive capacities by functional analyses and mechanistic explanations can be seamlessly integrated. It is shown that achieving such explanatory integration requires that the terms designating cognitive capacities in the two forms of explanation are stable but that experimental practice in the mind-brain sciences currently is not directed at achieving such stability. A positive proposal for changing experimental practice so as to promote such stability is put forward and its implications for explanatory integration are briefly considered.

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Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Sullivan, Jacqueline jsulli29@uwo.ca
Keywords:	cognitive neuroscience, construct, construct validity, functional analysis, integration, mechanistic explanation, neurobiology, unity
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science General Issues > Experimentation Specific Sciences > Psychology
Depositing User:	Jacqueline Sullivan
Date Deposited:	08 Dec 2015 14:56
Last Modified:	08 Dec 2015 14:56
Item ID:	11799
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science General Issues > Experimentation Specific Sciences > Psychology
Date:	15 June 2015
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/11799

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