Khudairi (Bowen), Hasen (Tim)
(2016)
Grounding, Conceivability, and the Mind-Body Problem.
Synthese.
pp. 1-8.
ISSN 0039-7857
Abstract
This paper challenges the soundness of the two-dimensional conceivability argument against the derivation of phenomenal truths from physical truths (cf. Chalmers in The conscious mind, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996; The character of consciousness, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) in light of a hyperintensional regimentation of the ontology of consciousness. The regimentation demonstrates how ontological dependencies between truths about consciousness and about physics cannot be witnessed by epistemic constraints, when the latter are recorded by the conceivability—i.e., the epistemic possibility—thereof. Generalizations and other aspects of the philosophical significance of the hyperintensional regimentation are further examined.
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Grounding, Conceivability, and the Mind-Body Problem. (deposited 14 Nov 2016 17:03)
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