Dewar, Neil (2017) Ramsey equivalence. [Preprint]

Preview

Text Newman_9.pdf Download (312kB) | Preview

Abstract

In the literature over the Ramsey-sentence approach to structural realism, there is often debate over whether structural realists can legitimately restrict the range of the second-order quantifiers, in order to avoid the Newman problem. In this paper, I argue that even if they are allowed to, it won’t help: even if the Ramsey sentence is interpreted using such restricted quantifiers, it is still an implausible candidate to capture a theory’s structural content. To do so, I use the following observation: if a Ramsey sentence did encode a theory’s structural content, then two theories would be structurally equivalent just in case they have logically equivalent Ramsey sentences. I then argue that this criterion for structural equivalence is implausible, even where frame or Henkin semantics are used.

---

Export/Citation:

EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL

Social Networking:

Share |

---

Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Dewar, Neil neil.dewar@lrz.uni-muenchen.de
Keywords:	Newman problem Ramsey sentence Theoretical equivalence
Subjects:	General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Structure of Theories
Depositing User:	Neil Dewar
Date Deposited:	21 Jul 2017 13:51
Last Modified:	21 Jul 2017 13:51
Item ID:	13237
Subjects:	General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Structure of Theories
Date:	17 April 2017
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/13237

Available Versions of this Item

• Ramsey equivalence. (deposited 08 Oct 2016 18:18)
  • Ramsey equivalence. (deposited 21 Jul 2017 13:51) [Currently Displayed]

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item