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Right out of the box: How to situate metaphysics of science in relation to other metaphysical approaches

Guay, Alexandre and Pradeu, Thomas (2017) Right out of the box: How to situate metaphysics of science in relation to other metaphysical approaches. Synthese. ISSN 1573-0964

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Abstract

Several advocates of the lively field of “metaphysics of science” have recently argued that a naturalistic metaphysics should be based solely on current science, and that it should replace more traditional, intuition-based, forms of metaphysics. The aim of the present paper is to assess that claim by examining the relations between metaphysics of science and general metaphysics. We show that the current metaphysical battlefield is richer and more complex than a simple dichotomy between “metaphysics of science” and “traditional metaphysics”, and that it should instead be understood as a three dimensional “box”, with one axis distinguishing “descriptive metaphysics” from “revisionary metaphysics,” a second axis distinguishing a priori from a posteriori metaphysics, and a third axis distinguishing “commonsense metaphysics”, “traditional metaphysics” and “metaphysics of science.” We use this three-dimensional figure to shed light on the project of current metaphysics of science, and to demonstrate that, in many instances, the target of that project is not defined with enough precision and clarity.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Guay, Alexandre
Pradeu, Thomas
Keywords: Metaphysics of science; Scientific metaphysics; Descriptive metaphysics; Revisionary metaphysics; Ontology; Naturalism; Realism; Physicalism
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Experimentation
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Laws of Nature
General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
General Issues > Models and Idealization
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
General Issues > Theory Change
General Issues > Theory/Observation
Depositing User: Thomas Pradeu
Date Deposited: 18 Sep 2017 13:51
Last Modified: 18 Sep 2017 13:51
Item ID: 13447
Journal or Publication Title: Synthese
Publisher: Springer (Springer Science+Business Media B.V.)
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Experimentation
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Laws of Nature
General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
General Issues > Models and Idealization
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
General Issues > Theory Change
General Issues > Theory/Observation
Date: 2017
ISSN: 1573-0964
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/13447

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