Northcott, Robert (2016) A dilemma for the Doomsday Argument. Ratio, 29 (3). pp. 268-282.

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Abstract

I present a new case in which the Doomsday Argument (‘DA’) runs afoul of epistemic intuition much more strongly than before. This leads to a dilemma: in the new case either DA is committed to unacceptable counterintuitiveness and belief in miracles, or else it is irrelevant. I then explore under what conditions DA can escape this dilemma. The discussion turns on several issues that have not been much emphasised in previous work on DA: a concern that I label trumping; the degree of uncertainty about relevant probability estimates; and the exact sequence in which we integrate DA and empirical concerns. I conclude that only given a particular configuration of these factors might DA still be of interest.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Northcott, Robert r.northcott@bbk.ac.uk
Keywords:	Doomsday Argument; probability; epistemology
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Decision Theory
Depositing User:	Dr Robert Northcott
Date Deposited:	29 Nov 2018 14:40
Last Modified:	29 Nov 2018 14:40
Item ID:	15387
Journal or Publication Title:	Ratio
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Decision Theory
Date:	September 2016
Page Range:	pp. 268-282
Volume:	29
Number:	3
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/15387

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