Gomez-Marin, Alex (2019) Computational neuroscience needs theoretical ethology: correcting an anthropomorphic bias. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Brains enjoy a bodily life. Therefore animals are subjects with a point of view. Yet, coding betrays an anthropomorphic bias: we can, therefore they must. Here I propose a reformulation of Brette’s question that emphasizes organismic perception, cautioning for misinterpretations based on external ideal-observer accounts. Theoretical ethology allows computational neuroscience to understand brains from the perspective of their owners.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Gomez-Marin, Alex 0000-0003-2764-2583
Keywords:	Umwelt, coding, behavior, neuroscience, objectivity
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Biology Specific Sciences > Neuroscience > Cognitive Neuroscience Specific Sciences > Psychology > Comparative Psychology and Ethology General Issues > Experimentation General Issues > Explanation General Issues > Theory/Observation
Depositing User:	Dr. Alex Gomez-Marin
Date Deposited:	04 Apr 2019 01:54
Last Modified:	04 Apr 2019 01:54
Item ID:	15877
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Biology Specific Sciences > Neuroscience > Cognitive Neuroscience Specific Sciences > Psychology > Comparative Psychology and Ethology General Issues > Experimentation General Issues > Explanation General Issues > Theory/Observation
Date:	3 April 2019
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/15877

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