Williamson, Jon (2020) A Bayesian account of establishing. [Preprint]
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Abstract
When a proposition is established, it can be taken as evidence for other propositions. Can the Bayesian theory of rational belief and action provide an account of establishing? I argue that it can, but only if the Bayesian is willing to endorse objective constraints on both probabilities and utilities, and willing to deny that it is rationally permissible to defer wholesale to expert opinion. I develop a new account of deference that accommodates this latter requirement.
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| Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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| Additional Information: | British Journal for the Philosophy of Science | ||||||
| Keywords: | Bayesianims; Evidence; Deference; Establishing | ||||||
| Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Artificial Intelligence General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Decision Theory General Issues > Evidence Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics |
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| Depositing User: | Prof Jon Williamson | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 20 Apr 2020 22:09 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 20 Apr 2020 22:09 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 17093 | ||||||
| Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Artificial Intelligence General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Decision Theory General Issues > Evidence Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics |
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| Date: | 20 April 2020 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/17093 |
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