Belot, Gordon (2023) Unprincipled. [Preprint]

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Abstract

It is widely thought that chance should be understood in reductionist terms: claims about chance should be understood as claims that certain patterns of events are instantiated. There are many possible reductionist theories of chance, differing as to which possible pattern of events they take to be chance-making. It is also widely taken to be a norm of rationality that credence should defer to chance: special cases aside, rationality requires that one's credence function, when conditionalized on the chance-making facts, should coincide with the objective chance function. It is a shortcoming of a theory of chance if implies that this norm of rationality is unsatisfiable. The primary goal of this paper is to show, on the basis of considerations concerning computability and inductive learning, that this shortcoming is more common than one would have hoped.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Belot, Gordon belot@umich.edu
Additional Information:	Forthcoming in The Review of Symbolic Logic
Keywords:	chance, credence, Principal Principle, computable Bayesianism
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Formal Learning Theory General Issues > Laws of Nature Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Depositing User:	Gordon Belot
Date Deposited:	07 Jun 2023 12:23
Last Modified:	07 Jun 2023 12:23
Item ID:	22200
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Formal Learning Theory General Issues > Laws of Nature Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Date:	23 June 2023
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/22200

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