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Representationalism and Rationality: Why Mental Representation is Real

Bielecka, Krystyna and Miłkowski, Marcin (2024) Representationalism and Rationality: Why Mental Representation is Real. [Preprint]

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Abstract

This paper presents an argument for the realism about mechanisms, contents, and vehicles of mental representation at both the personal and subpersonal levels, and showcases its role in instrumental rationality and proper cognitive functioning. By demonstrating how misrepresentation is necessary for learning from mistakes and explaining certain failures of action, we argue that fallible rational agents must have mental representations with causally relevant vehicles of content. Our argument contributes to ongoing discussions in philosophy of mind and cognitive science by challenging anti-realist views about the nature of mental representation, and by highlighting the importance of understanding how different agents can misrepresent in pursuit of their goals. While there are potential rebuttals to our claim, our opponents must explain how agents can be rational without having mental representations. This is because mental representation is grounded in rationality.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Bielecka, Krystynakikab.gazeta.pl@gmail.com0000-0002-8341-8335
Miłkowski, Marcinmarcin.milkowski@ifispan.edu.pl0000-0001-7646-5742
Additional Information: forthcoming in Synthese
Keywords: mental representation; anti-representationalism; subpersonal representation; misrepresentation; aboutness; instrumental rationality; vehicles of content; learning from mistakes
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations
Specific Sciences > Psychology
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User: Dr. Marcin Miłkowski
Date Deposited: 05 May 2024 08:42
Last Modified: 05 May 2024 08:42
Item ID: 23361
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations
Specific Sciences > Psychology
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date: 24 February 2024
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/23361

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