Dietrich, Franz and List, Christian (2024) Dynamically rational judgment aggregation. Social Choice and Welfare.
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Abstract
Judgment-aggregation theory has always focused on the attainment of rational collective judgments. But so far, rationality has been understood in static terms: as coherence of judgments at a given time, defined as consistency, completeness, and/or deductive closure. This paper asks whether collective judgments can be dynamically rational, so that they change rationally in response to new information. Formally, a judgment aggregation rule is dynamically rational with respect to a given revision operator if, whenever all individuals revise their judgments in light of some information (a learnt proposition), then the new aggregate judgments are the old ones revised in light of this information, i.e., aggregation and revision commute. We prove an impossibility theorem: if the propositions on the agenda are non-trivially connected, no judgment aggregation rule with standard properties is dynamically rational with respect to any revision operator satisfying some basic conditions. Our theorem is the dynamic-rationality counterpart of some well-known impossibility theorems for static rationality. We also explore how dynamic rationality might be achieved by relaxing some of the conditions on the aggregation rule and/or the revision operator. Notably, premise-based aggregation rules are dynamically rational with respect to so-called premise-based revision operators.
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| Item Type: | Published Article or Volume | |||||||||
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| Keywords: | Judgment aggregation, belief revision, dynamic rationality, impossibility theorems | |||||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Decision Theory Specific Sciences > Economics General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science |
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| Depositing User: | Christian List | |||||||||
| Date Deposited: | 18 May 2024 07:43 | |||||||||
| Last Modified: | 18 May 2024 07:43 | |||||||||
| Item ID: | 23442 | |||||||||
| Journal or Publication Title: | Social Choice and Welfare | |||||||||
| Publisher: | Springer-Nature | |||||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Decision Theory Specific Sciences > Economics General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science |
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| Date: | 2024 | |||||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/23442 |
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Dynamically rational judgment aggregation. (deposited 06 Feb 2021 21:10)
- Dynamically rational judgment aggregation. (deposited 18 May 2024 07:43) [Currently Displayed]
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