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A quadrilemma for theories of consciousness

List, Christian (2024) A quadrilemma for theories of consciousness. The Philosophical Quarterly.

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Abstract

In this paper, I argue that no theory of consciousness can simultaneously respect four initially plausible metaphysical claims – namely, ‘first-person realism’, ‘non-solipsism’, ‘non-fragmentation’, and ‘one world’ – but that any three of the four claims are mutually consistent. So, theories of consciousness face a ‘quadrilemma’. Since it will be hard to achieve a consensus on which of the four claims to retain and which to give up, we arrive at a landscape of competing theories, all of which have pros and cons. I will briefly indicate which kinds of theories correspond to the four horns of the quadrilemma.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
List, Christian
Keywords: Consciousness, Subjectivity, Objectivity, Quadrilemma, Facts, First-person realism, Non-solipsism, Non-fragmentation, One world versus many worlds, Meta-problem of consciousness
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Consciousness
General Issues > Structure of Theories
Depositing User: Christian List
Date Deposited: 03 Jun 2024 14:39
Last Modified: 03 Jun 2024 14:39
Item ID: 23519
Journal or Publication Title: The Philosophical Quarterly
DOI or Unique Handle: https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqae053
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Consciousness
General Issues > Structure of Theories
Date: 3 June 2024
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/23519

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