List, Christian (2024) Decision theory presupposes free will. [Preprint]

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Abstract

This paper argues that decision theory presupposes free will. Although decision theorists seldom acknowledge this, the way decision theory represents, explains, or rationalizes choice behaviour acquires its intended interpretation only under the assumption that decision-makers are agents capable of making free choices between alternative possibilities. Without that assumption, both normative and descriptive decision theory, including the revealed-preference paradigm, would have to be reinterpreted in implausible ways. The hypothesis that decision-makers have free will is therefore explanatorily indispensable for decision theory. If we regard explanatory indispensability as an indicator of reality in science, decision theorists should embrace the idea of free will.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID List, Christian
Keywords:	Decision theory, free will, alternative possibilities, choice-making agency, explanatory indispensability, predictability
Subjects:	General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics General Issues > Decision Theory Specific Sciences > Economics Specific Sciences > Psychology > Judgment and Decision Making
Depositing User:	Christian List
Date Deposited:	21 Aug 2024 10:35
Last Modified:	21 Aug 2024 10:35
Item ID:	23796
Subjects:	General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics General Issues > Decision Theory Specific Sciences > Economics Specific Sciences > Psychology > Judgment and Decision Making
Date:	13 August 2024
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/23796

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