Harbecke, Jens Rational Choice Theory between Causation and Explanation. UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

This paper focuses on two arguments recently developed in the literature against the interpretation of rational choice theory as an empirical theory. It starts with a reconstruction of a historical analysis, according to which rational choice theory has mostly been used in the past as a methodological principle and rarely as a deep empirical theory. In a next step, it challenges an argument found in the literature that social and economic phenomena are ontically emergent and that they by themselves can enter genuine explanations. Subsequently, it criticizes the methodological assumption about the irrelevance of psychological mechanisms of the individual for economic models. The main reason offered is the observation that such models, even if predictively adequate, will be very limited in their explanatory power. The overall conclusion of the paper is that rational choice theory ought to be treated as a theory after all - and potentially extended by future empirical research.

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Item Type:	Other
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Harbecke, Jens jens.harbecke@uni-wh.de 0000-0002-1124-3302
Keywords:	Rational Choice Theory; Causation; Explanation
Subjects:	General Issues > Causation General Issues > Decision Theory Specific Sciences > Economics General Issues > Explanation General Issues > Models and Idealization
Depositing User:	Prof. Dr. Jens Harbecke
Date Deposited:	19 Oct 2024 13:50
Last Modified:	19 Oct 2024 13:50
Item ID:	24084
Subjects:	General Issues > Causation General Issues > Decision Theory Specific Sciences > Economics General Issues > Explanation General Issues > Models and Idealization
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/24084

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