Elia, Gino (2024) The Realist Game: Scientific Theories and QBist Ontology. In: UNSPECIFIED.
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Abstract
Debates in quantum ontology often center on finding “candidate ontologies” to fit quantum physics. Recent progress in quantum reconstruction programs, such as QBism, and empirical successes around designing experiments that directly model quantum phenomena, such as tests of contextuality, suggest new strategies for conceptualizing quantum ontology. Notably physicists in these approaches have largely abandoned treating quantum ontology like “things.” In this talk, I discuss how debates in quantum ontology relate to the philosophical demand for realism in scientific theories. I call the search for a stable list of criteria in scientific theories that satisfy our demands for ontological realism the “realist game.” The realist game has been played many times, notably by van Fraassen, Putnam, McMullin, and others. Using Tim Maudlin’s assumption that there is no special divide between physics and metaphysics, I propose my own “realist game” to articulate a list of ontological demands. I draw upon the history of Feynman diagrams and QBist ontology as case studies to “play” the realist game according to the parameters of scientific inquiry. To ensure our ontological demands are consistent with each other, I argue a successful win of the realist game cannot favor any single hypothetical ontology, nor can our criteria turn realism itself into a hypothesis. From this, I conclude that our ontological pursuits do not necessarily, or even usually, take the form of proposing “an” ontology.
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| Item Type: | Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED) | ||||||
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| Keywords: | ontology, physics, QBism, theory, realism | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Theory Change General Issues > Theory/Observation |
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| Depositing User: | Gino Elia | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 05 Dec 2024 13:07 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 05 Dec 2024 13:07 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 24351 | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Theory Change General Issues > Theory/Observation |
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| Date: | 4 December 2024 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/24351 |
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