Solomon, Toby C.P.
(2025)
Risk-averse Causalists aren't so easily frustrated.
[Preprint]
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TCP Solomon - Risk-averse Causalists arent so easily frustrated - Preprint.pdf
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Abstract
Jack Spencer and Ian Wells have recently argued that Causal Decision Theory
faces special difficulty in cases of decision-instability where a play-it-safe option is present. They argue that CDT recommends taking a risky option, while the rational thing to do is to play it safe. In this paper I will show that CDT only recommends the risky option if we assume risk neutrality—a version of CDT allowing for risk-aversion can vindicate (sometimes) playing it safe. This opens two lines of response to Spencer and Wells for Causalists: They can embrace a version of CDT that allows for rational risk-aversion. Or they can reject the intuition to play it safe on the general grounds that risk-aversion is irrational. I will show that risk-aversion may be playing a role in intuitions in a more famous case of decision- instability: Egan's Psychopath Button. Of course, risk-aversion cannot explain all Causal Decision Theory's problems and I will bolster the case for risk-aversion playing a special role in these cases by considering the limits of such an approach in dealing with a related problem from Ahmed. Finally I will show how appeal to risk-aversion can help with a more recent diachronic variation from Spencer.
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