Takács, Izolda
(2024)
One Approach to the Necessary Conditions of Free Will
Logical Paradox and the Essential Unpredictability of Physical Agents.
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Abstract
Even today, there is no precise definition of free will – only mere hypotheses and intuitions. This is why this paper will approach the question of free will from a negative perspective, depicting a scenario in which free will seemingly exists. Subsequently, it will attempt to refute this scenario (as a necessary condition for free will). The absence of free will might seem absolute if scientific determinism holds true. Therefore, the goal of the study is to present a logical argument (paradox) that demonstrates the impossibility of an omniscient (P) predictor (scientific determinism), highlighting its inherent self-contradiction. This paradox reveals that the prediction (P = C) by a (P) physical agent of itself is objectively impossible. In other words, even a fully deterministic agent in a deterministic universe cannot predict its own future state, not even in a Platonic sense.
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One Approach to the Necessary Conditions of Free Will
Logical Paradox and the Essential Unpredictability of Physical Agents. (deposited 27 Mar 2025 14:44)
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