Dellsén, Finnur (2025) Promoting Scientific Progress. [Preprint]

	Text Promotion Accepted.pdf Download (173kB)
	Text Promotion Accepted.pdf Download (173kB)

Abstract

In the philosophical debate about scientific progress, several authors appeal to a distinction between what constitutes scientific progress and what promotes it (e.g., Bird, 2008; Rowbottom, 2008; Dellsén, 2016). However, the extant literature is almost completely silent on what exactly it is for scientific progress to be promoted. Here I provide a precise account of progress promotion on which it consists, roughly, in increasing expected progress. This account may be combined with any of the major theories of what constitutes scientific progress, such as the truthlikeness, problem-solving, epistemic, and noetic accounts. However, I will also suggest that once we have this account of progress promotion up and running, some accounts of what constitutes progress become harder to motivate by the sorts of considerations often adduced in their favor, while others turn out to be easier to defend against common objections.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Dellsén, Finnur finnurd@gmail.com 0000-0003-4989-4204
Additional Information:	Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies.
Keywords:	scientific progress; promoting progress; rational expectation
Subjects:	General Issues > Decision Theory General Issues > Theory Change
Depositing User:	Dr. Finnur Dellsén
Date Deposited:	07 Apr 2025 14:18
Last Modified:	07 Apr 2025 14:18
Item ID:	25001
Subjects:	General Issues > Decision Theory General Issues > Theory Change
Date:	2025
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/25001

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