Yang, Zhiwei (2025) Is Rich Phenomenology Fragmented? [Preprint]

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Abstract

Some philosophers argue that the content of iconic memory is conscious, called the Rich View. However, critics ain that only fragments of the content of iconic memory are conscious, called the Fragment View. Both sides cite different psychological experimental data to support their positions. Proponents of the Fragment View tend to assert that their view uniquely explains the data they rely on. The uniqueness of the Fragment View is challenged here. Newly introduced evidence suggests that the data supporting the Fragment View may also be compatible with the Rich View. Given the theoretical advantages of the Rich View in other respects, there are reasons to consider it the superior one.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Yang, Zhiwei allenminesky@gmail.com 0009-0008-7565-9068
Keywords:	Rich View, Fragment View, Consciousness, Iconic Memory
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Consciousness
Depositing User:	Mr. Zhiwei Yang
Date Deposited:	05 May 2025 12:26
Last Modified:	05 May 2025 12:26
Item ID:	25243
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Consciousness
Date:	4 May 2025
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/25243

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