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Two quantum-mechanical arguments against the metaphysical equivalence between substratum and bundle theories of individuality

Arroyo, Raoni and Arenhart, Jonas R. B. (2025) Two quantum-mechanical arguments against the metaphysical equivalence between substratum and bundle theories of individuality. [Preprint]

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Abstract

It is a widespread consensus among metaphysicians that the bundle and substratum theories are substantially different metaphysical theories of individuality. In a realist stance towards metaphysics, they cannot both track the truth when describing fundamental reality, thus they’re rival metaphysical theories. Against that consensus, Jiri Benovsky has advanced a metametaphysical thesis that they are in fact metaphysically equivalent. This paper challenges Benovsky’s equivalence thesis with two counter-arguments based on the metaphysics of quantum mechanics: quantum metaphysical indeterminacy and wavefunction realism. As we shall argue, while both substratum and bundle theories arguably fail in standard quantum mechanics, they fail in different ways. Hence, given Benovsky’s own notion of metaphysical equivalence, they are not equivalent.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Arroyo, Raonirwarroyo@unicamp.br0000-0002-3800-8505
Arenhart, Jonas R. B.jonas.becker2@gmail.com
Additional Information: Forthcoming in Análisis Filosófico, special issue on the metaphysics of science
Keywords: Metaphysical equivalence; Metametaphysics; Metaphysics of quantum mechanics; Substratum and bundle theories of individuality; Metaphysical underdetermination
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
Depositing User: Dr. Raoni Arroyo
Date Deposited: 04 Aug 2025 13:03
Last Modified: 04 Aug 2025 13:03
Item ID: 26114
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
Date: August 2025
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/26114

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