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When Naturalisms Collide: Neural Representations as Scientific Posits and Metaphysical Entities

Hochstein, Eric (2025) When Naturalisms Collide: Neural Representations as Scientific Posits and Metaphysical Entities. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Can neural representations be naturalized? Current debates surrounding the naturalization of representations in neuroscience typically characterize this project in terms of one of three options: methodological naturalism, ontological naturalism, or the belief that both types of naturalism provide support for, and constraints on, each other to drive inquiry. In this paper, I argue that all three of these options are problematic. The two projects of naturalism cannot be pulled apart from one another, nor can one act as effective support/constraint on the other. The relationship between these projects of naturalism is far more complex, nuanced, and interdependent than is typically thought. I highlight how this influences current debates regarding the nature of representation in neuroscientific practice.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Hochstein, Ericehochstein@uvic.ca
Additional Information: Forthcoming in Philosophy and the Mind Sciences
Keywords: Naturalism, Ontological Naturalism, Methodological Naturalism, Representation, Intentionality
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Specific Sciences > Neuroscience
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User: Dr. Eric Hochstein
Date Deposited: 22 Aug 2025 14:32
Last Modified: 22 Aug 2025 14:32
Item ID: 26322
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Specific Sciences > Neuroscience
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date: 2025
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/26322

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