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Representational Interference and the Limits of Abstract Representation

Riss, Uwe V. (2025) Representational Interference and the Limits of Abstract Representation. [Preprint]

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Abstract

This paper introduces the Representational Uncertainty Principle (RUP) as a structural account of the limits of representational precision. We argue that as representations become more narrowly defined—by fixing more internal structure—they constrain the integration of perceptual and contextual cues. This often suppresses representational flexibility: the capacity to draw on multiple situational cues to stabilize meaning. When this flexibility is reduced, representational diffraction becomes more prominent: a structural phenomenon in which aspects of a situation are subsumed under a representation that deviates from the expected or standard framing, resulting in ambiguity or tension. Drawing on a structural analogy with quantum mechanics, we treat interference and diffraction as complementary manifestations of how representational content is formed. This framework explains why overly precise representations often fail in contexts that demand sensitivity to subtle variations. We support this account through examples of conceptual ambiguity and apparent contradiction, and by developing a framework that distinguishes between the structuring role of the representational vehicle and the dynamic process of integration that gives rise to content. The RUP thus highlights a structural tension between abstraction, context sensitivity, and the need for orientation within experience.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Riss, Uwe V.uwe.riss@gmail.com0000-0003-0123-272X
Additional Information: This is the author’s accepted manuscript (post–peer-review) of the paper “Representational Uncertainty: A Structural Analogy between Perception and Quantum Mechanics,” forthcoming in Synthese (Springer Nature). The manuscript incorporates all revisions requested during peer review but has not yet undergone Springer’s copyediting or typesetting. The final published version will be available via SpringerLink once the DOI is assigned. Please cite the published version when available.
Keywords: Representation, Interference, Perceptual Integration, Representational Uncertainty Principle, Contextual Meaning, Abstraction, Quantum Analogy
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Perception
Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
General Issues > Thought Experiments
Depositing User: Uwe V. Riss
Date Deposited: 16 Oct 2025 11:21
Last Modified: 16 Oct 2025 11:21
Item ID: 26940
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Perception
Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
General Issues > Thought Experiments
Date: 18 July 2025
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/26940

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