PhilSci Archive

Einstein's 1935 Letters to Schrödinger and Popper and the Boundaries of the PBR ψ-Epistemic Framework

Weinstein, Galina (2025) Einstein's 1935 Letters to Schrödinger and Popper and the Boundaries of the PBR ψ-Epistemic Framework. [Preprint]

[img] Text
2511.23125v1.pdf

Download (313kB)

Abstract

Einstein's 1935 critique of quantum mechanics is often associated with the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) argument, yet his private correspondence from that year reveals a more exact conceptual structure guiding his claim that the ψ-function is incomplete. This paper reconstructs Einstein's reasoning in his letters to Schrödinger and Popper and examines how it engages, and fails to engage with contemporary ψ-ontic/ψ-epistemic distinctions. Recent scholarship, most notably by Ben-Menahem, has interpreted Einstein as an early representative of the modern ψ-epistemic tradition within the Harrigan-Spekkens ontological models framework and the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph (PBR) theorem. I argue, however, that this retrospective classification is undermined by Ben-Menahem's own distinction between realist and radical epistemic interpretations: Einstein's 1935 view lacks the structural assumptions - defined ontic state space, preparation distributions, and overlap structure - required for membership in the HS/PBR class of ψ-epistemic models. Any such identification, therefore, requires importing formal machinery foreign to Einstein's original argument


Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Weinstein, Galinagaliweinstein.mc2@gmail.com
Keywords: ψ-ontic, ψ-epistemic, Einstein, EPR, PBR, Harrigan-Spekkens, Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph, Schrödinger, Popper, ensemble, microstate, macrostate, Bayesian updating, Pitowsky, Ben-Menahem, separability, locality, overlap, quantum, preparation independence, incomplete, ontic, epistemic, realist, catalogue of expectations
Subjects: General Issues > Evidence
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Laws of Nature
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User: Dr. Galina Weinstein
Date Deposited: 02 Dec 2025 12:00
Last Modified: 02 Dec 2025 12:00
Item ID: 27335
Subjects: General Issues > Evidence
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Laws of Nature
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date: 28 November 2025
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/27335

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item